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I. INTRODUCTION

Understanding Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's contribution to the Nation's
jurisprudence on race, education, and the Constitution requires an inspection of
a number of cases and a number of issues. Among the key issues is the proper
standard of review for Equal Protection Clause purposes l In Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, a case decided more than twenty years ago, the
school board introduced a layoff system designed to maintain a racially
integrated faculty.2 The layoff plan displaced white teachers before displacing
black teachers.3 The Supreme Court invalidated the plan without supplying a
majority opinion, but specific Justices offered a range of positions regarding

+ Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Elizabeth McKay, Robert Sedler,
and Ilya Somin provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am indebted to Derrick Bell for his
comments about the theme for this essay. The usual caveat applies. Research support was
provided by the Law & Economics Center, George Mason University School of Law.
1. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 801 (7th ed. 2004)
("The Court in Wygant, as in Bakke, did not resolve the issue of what standard should be applied
to determine whether a state or local government program designed to aid members of a minority
race violated the equal protection clause."). See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27
(2003); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978).
2. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 801
(identifying purpose of layoff system).
3. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
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the appropriate standard of review. 4 Justice O'Connor wrote an intriguing
concurrence signifying that a majority of Justices might uphold a race-5
conscious hiring program that was aimed at creating a racially diverse faculty.
This concurrence foreshadowed her opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.6 In
Grutter, Justice O'Connor, consistent with the teaching of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., deployed strict scrutiny analysis to assess the permissibility of the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions plan.7 Whatever standard of
review is chosen, race-conscious decision-making in the United States takes
place within a turbulent arena that is exacerbated by the probability that the
racial achievement gap in public schools and institutions of higher education
signals "a problem of national scope" that represents "the greatest civil rights
issue of our time." 8 Justice O'Connor's opinions have been praised since her
retirement in 2005, 9 while the Court has faced a series of attacks.
One of the Court's sharpest critics, Ronald Dworkin, insists that the Court's
failure to follow Justice O'Connor's leadership on a number of equal
protection questions contributes to an alarming insurrection. 10 This rebellion
"is proceeding with breathtaking impatience, and it is a revolution [that is
inflated by] its disdain for tradition and precedent."'" Evidently, the Supreme
Court's consolidated decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1,12 decided in 2007, has prompted Dworkin's
4. See id. at 279-80 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 285-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 30103 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 816-18 (for discussion of the various standards of review articulated
in the five opinions).
5. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
7. Id. at 326 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
8. Katherine Kersten, Teach Character to Cut Racial Gap in School Results,
STARTRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 22, 2007, at B 1. See also ABIGAIL THERNSTROM AND
STEPHAN THERNSTROM, No EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 12 (2003) ("The

[National Assessment of Educational Progress] results show a frightening gap between the basic
academic skills of the average African-American or Latino student and those of the typical white
or Asian American.").
9. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27,
2007, at 92, 95 (describing Justice O'Connor's opinions as "increasingly sophisticated and
thoughtful"). Admiration of Justice O'Connor may be tied to her early embrace of diversity. See,
e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (signaling her willingness to uphold a school board program that considered race in
hiring of teachers so as to create a racially diverse faculty in schools). But see E-mail from
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Visiting Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Harry G. Hutchison,
Professor of Law, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law (Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with author) (stating
that there is little reason to celebrate "Justice O'Connor's contribution to the nation's discussion
on race").
10. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 92.
11. Id.
12. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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contempt. He maintains that the Court's consolidated decision striking down
race-based student assignment plans constitutes the Court's most important
opinion illustrating "the revolutionary character and poor legal quality of many
of the Court's . . . decsins."
In Parents Involved, neither official
discrimination nor diversity rationales were adequate to justify the race-based
"tiebreakers" used by14the public school systems in Seattle, Washington, and
Louisville, Kentucky.
Whatever one's view of the outcome of the Parents Involved case may be,
given society's conflicting interpretations of the guarantee of equal protection,
it is far from clear that Dworkin's allegations are beyond doubt. Philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre supplies a more balanced perspective, which suggests that
a perpetually unsettled character pertains to America's contemporary moral
and philosophical debates.' 5 Such disputes, fastened as they are to alternative
and incompatible notions of justice, 16 are unlikely to be resolved short of
authoritarianism or oblivion despite society's frequent invocation of the
language of pluralism, democracy, and equality. This vocabulary generates a
dense fog, which masks the depth and extent of disagreement among
Americans and confirms Karl Marx's observation 17that "conflict and not
consensus [is] at the heart of modem social structure."'
It has been noted that "[i]n any sphere of inquiry the highway of
methodology is paved with epistemological commitments." 8 It is the same in
law, "as in all the disciplines, [that] method is controlled by assumptions about
the aims of inquiry, the possibility of knowledge, the conditions for its
attainment," and the probability of indeterminacy.
The advent of language
expands reality, for words represent not merely the immediate world of
presence, but also 'what is absent, not only what is near but also what is far,
not only the past but also the future.' 2
Analysis of adjudication must
13. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 92.
14. Samuel Estreicher, The Non-Preferment Principle and the "'RacialTiebreaker" Cases,
2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 239-40 (2007), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
scr/2007/.
15.

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 235 (Am. ed.

1981) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]. See also Harry G. Hutchison, Shaming
Kindergarteners?Channeling Dred Scott? Freedom of Expression Rights in Public Schools, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 361-68 (2007) (noting the "cultural separation" and tension between
opposing efforts to either restore religion to or remove religion from public life).
16. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 235.
17. Id. ("None the less Marx was fundamentally right in seeing conflict and not consensus at
the heart of modem social structure.").
18. R.J. Snell, Upon This Rock: Human Realism and Geivett's Myth, 9 PHILOSOPHIA
CHRISTI 365, 365 (2007) (quoting R. Douglas Geivett, Is God a Story? Postmodernity and the
Task of Theology, in CHRISTIANITY AND THE POSTMODERN TURN: SIX VIEWS 37-38 (Myron B.
Penner ed., 2005)).
19. Id. at 365-66.
20. Id. at 368 (quoting THE LONERGAN READER 388 (Mark D. Morelli & Elizabeth A.
Morelli eds., 1997)).
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conform to the likelihood that "'we come to live, not as the infant in the world
of immediate experience, but in a far vaster world that is brought to us through
the memories of other men, through the common sense of community, through
the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars."' 21 Claims and counterclaims compete as part of America's conversation regarding race and equal
protection. This competition is consistent with the observation that we, all of
us, inhabit a larger world that is mediated by meaning, but which transcends
"anyone's immediate experience .... [W]hat is meant is not only experienced
22

but also somehow understood and, commonly, [perhaps] also affirmed.,
Given America's absence of a shared and deeply understood racial history,
or a uniform understanding of justice, we should not be surprised that
contrasting judgments arise from inspecting the Niagara of words that have
been used to justify or destabilize Supreme Court proclamations about race.
Inevitably such vivisections improve the lives and the career prospects of the
various speakers but deliver few benefits to the truly disadvantaged among us.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, for example, the Court examined an

equal protection challenge under the Fifth Amendment where Justice
O'Connor noted that "[t]he Court's failure to produce a majority opinion in
Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant left unresolved the proper analysis for remedial
race-based governmental action."2 3 The repercussions of that failure go
beyond what appellees or appellants experience. Instead, this failure affirms
indeterminacy.
In a series of recent cases,

24

members of the Court have offered a number of

differing opinions. Differences arose about whether deference to a university's
educational judgment can be justified or instead whether such deference
constitutes a violation of the Constitution. 25 Additional distinctions emerge
regarding whether the First Amendment protects or is immaterial to a public
26
university's use of race in admissions, and whether the prospect of future
educational progress in minority communities sustains contemporary

21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 221 (1995).
24. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
25. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."), with id.at 386-87

(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that the Constitution gives the Law School such
free rein in the use of race.").
26. Compare id.at 329 (majority opinion) ("In announcing the principle of student body
diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a
constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy ...."),
with id.at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder strict scrutiny, the Law School's assessment of
the benefits of racial discrimination and devotion to the admissions status quo are not entitled to
any sort of deference, grounded in the First Amendment or anywhere else.").
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justifications for race-based preferences. 27 Whether one agrees or disagrees
with Grutter,28 Gratz v. Bollinger,29 or Parents Involved,30 disputes surface
about the presence of unlawful racial balancing. 31 Though educational benefits
may evolve from diversity, tension arises over whether a critical mass of
minority students defined in reference to these benefits is allowable or
32
impermissible.
Conflict also emerges over whether the "historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities" in certain professions is important or
irrelevant, 3 or whether courts should defer or decline to defer to claims of
good faith by governmental units. 34 Difficulties materialize regarding whether
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause should vary with the reasons for
using race as a determinant. 35 Questions surface about whether attempts to
regulate the enrollment of blacks and other minorities in educational programs
constitute a "badge of inferiority,' '36 or amount to a defensible remedy aimed at
eradicating the effects of the nation's history of racial segregation, white
supremacy, and societal discrimination. 37 Such discussions are often tinged
with paradox. An additional paradox issues forth because black students
attending Historically Black Colleges "experience superior cognitive
development" in environments that are not integrated 38 and "report higher

27. See, e.g., id at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
29. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
30. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (majority opinion) (endorsing Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion in which he rejected the "interest in 'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools . . .' as an unlawful interest in racial balancing" (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978))).
32. Id. ("As part of its goal of 'assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically
qualified and broadly diverse,' the Law School seeks to 'enroll a "critical mass" of minority
students.' The Law School's interest is not simply 'to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.' That
would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional." (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citations omitted))).
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (opinion of Powell, J.).
34. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
35. See id. ("Before the Court's decision today, we consistently applied the same strict
scrutiny analysis regardless of the government's purported reason for using race and regardless of
the setting in which race was being used. We rejected calls to use more lenient review in the face
of claims that race was being used in 'good faith'....").
36. Id. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
37. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (opinion of Powell, J.) (rejecting an interest in remedying
societal discrimination).
38. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Lamont Flowers & Ernest T. Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College Racial Composition on
African American Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J. COLL. STUDENT DEV. 669, 674 (1999)
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39
academic achievement than those attending predominantly white colleges."

Viewpoints on race and education are not necessarily predetermined by race,
ethnicity, or political preference. Some progressives favor integration.4 °
Others have discovered the benefits of racial separation.4 1 Both liberals and
conservatives can be found on each side of the school choice divide. Some
commentators proclaim the advantages of diversity, 42 while others note that
diversity is a nebulous concept that is infinitely elastic and capable of various
meanings.43 At times, conservatives and liberals appear to favor public school
diversity so long as it does not disturb their own children's education or
diminish their housing values.44
The Milton, Massachusetts case is instructive.45 During the spring of 2007,
the "town officials in th[e] affluent Boston suburb changed the elementaryschool assignments for 38 streets-and sparked outrage. Some white families
had been reassigned to Tucker, a mostly black school which has historically
had Milton's lowest test scores. ''46 Possibly imagining that minority schools
are inherently bad,47 and presuming race is a proxy for educational proficiency,

(noting "the growing evidence that . . . heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black
students")).
39. Id.at 365 (citing Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success: African-American College
Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and
Universities, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 35 (1992)).
40. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 267 (2006)
("[R]adical integration[] should both form the centerpiece of a progressive social agenda and be
aggressively advanced as a political goal.").
41. See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 190 (1996) (finding value in "limited separation," which can be defined as "voluntary
racial isolation that serves to support and nurture individuals within the group without
unnecessarily trammeling the interests of other individuals or groups").
42. See, e.g., Cruz Reynoso & Cory Amran, Diversity in Legal Education:A Broader View,
a Deeper Commitment, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 491, 492 (2002) ("[S]chools must come to view
diversity as synonymous with excellence in[] education.... [C]ompetition, globalization, and the
demands of our increasingly complex and dynamic society, will require that 'diversity' be a
multidimensional concept.... Diversity must become the thriving norm.").
43. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Race in the City: The Triumph of Diversity and the Loss of
Integration,22 J.L. & POL. 49, 79 (2006) ("Diversity ... can be anything to almost anyone: a
slogan or a mandate, a program or a label, but there need not be any shared purpose .... [A]ny
concept that can be used liberally and interchangeably by Republican and Democratic Presidents
alike is probably a term without significant content.").
44. See, e.g., Joseph Pereira, School Integration Efforts Face Renewed Opposition, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11,2007, at Al.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Wendy Parker, Valuing Integration: Lessons from Teachers, WAKE FOREST U.
LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 2007, at 4, http://ssm.com/abstract=-1014366 (noting
minority support for segregation because of "integration's failure to deliver educational quality
and its assumption that all-minority schools are bad schools").
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one white parent remarked that he did not feel good about putting his daughter
in an inferior school. 48 He is not alone. In one of America's most progressive
states, in one of its most liberal towns where the state's African American
governor resides, the parents, while
49 supportive of diversity, were distressed by
the prospect of serious integration.
At the same time, Professor Michelle Adams, a thoughtful proponent of
"radical integration," illuminates a counter-trend characterized by "the
emergence of [separate] black, middle-class suburban enclaves." 50 While this
move perpetuates 5racial isolation and promotes what Dworkin labels a
"national disgrace,", ' this development is provoked in part by the attraction of
voluntary separation, which guarantees that black people maintain control and
reflects a desire to preserve a "'cultural heritage[] that distinguish[es] them
from other groups. ' 52 Such maneuvers, driven by sincere individual choice,
raise the following question: Does observed separation by African Americans
into black enclaves, by whites into largely white neighborhoods, or by Jews
into largely Jewish areas, 53 constitute segregation that should alarm us?
Attempts to calculate the benefits of separation weighed against the risk of
integration bring to mind the dilemma faced by the educated Jews of Breslau
during Prussian-era Germany. Alisdair Maclntyre writes:
[They] could not have been unaware not only of continuing oldfashioned anti-Semitism, but also of the double character of most
German . . . cultural responses to the recent emancipation of the
Jews, of the terrible inability of late nineteenth[-century] Germans to
allow Jews to be Jews and yet to be Germans too, [as well as] the all
too common German insistence that the Jew who remained faithful
to Judaism thereby made her or himself less of a German.54
In addition to the difficulties associated with the desire of many Americans
to separate into racial and ethnic enclaves, complications surface because
arguments favoring integration are undermined by reliance on questionable
evidence. Consider Professor Parker's assertion that America should value
integration, particularly teacher integration: because "student segregation has
had a negative effect on the experience level of teachers for minority students"
as a result of the fact that "white teachers typically flee minority schools as
soon as they are able, and . . . the number of minority teachers is inadequate to
48. Pereira, supra note 44.
49. See id.
50. Adams, supra note 40, at 266-67.
51. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 92.
52. Adams, supra note 40, at 266-67.
53. See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Hasidic Public School Loses Again Before U.S. Supreme
Court, but Supporters Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1999, at B5 (discussing the attempt by
Hasidic Jews to carve out a separate public school district in upstate New York).
54.

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, EDITH STEIN: A PHILOSOPHICAL PROLOGUE, 1913-1922, 12-

13 (2006) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, EDITH STEIN].
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staff fully minority schools." 55 Here, Parker argues, educational research
reveals that teachers' experience has an impact on student success. 5 6 She
asserts that student integration is necessary to ensure an increase in the number
of experienced teachers who teach minority students.5 7 She argues that this
development is needed to improve the academic performance of such
students. 58 This claim is problematic. Professor Greene shows that while it is

true that "teachers do get a little more effective in their first few years of
teaching as they learn how to cope in the classroom, . . . [a]fter those first few

years teachers do not tend to get more effective with further years of
experience., 59 Indeed, "some evidence [shows] that teachers get less effective
in the later stages of their careers, perhaps because of adverse incentives
arising from the inability of most schools to fire veteran teachers even when
their performance is very poor.'

60

This implies that Parker's assumption that

the teacher experience data supports integration is contestable.
Equally important, Professor Greene shows "that on average private schools
are actually more racially integrated than public schools." 61 Although it is true
that "'the share of white students attending private schools ... is double that of
Hispanic and black students,"' 62 those statistics belie the state of integration in
private schools. First, having a greater number of minority students does not
mean that schools are better integrated; 63 second, racially diverse students are
not necessarily evenly distributed throughout the public school system; 64 and
third, parents show greater confidence sending their children to racially diverse
55.
56.
57.
58.

Parker, supra note 47, at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.

59.

JAY P. GREENE ET AL., EDUCATION MYTHS: WHAT SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WANT

YOU TO BELIEVE ABOUT OUR SCHOOLS-AND WHY IT ISN'T So 60 (2005).
60. Id. (emphasis added). Professor Greene also describes evidence that suggests a low
correlation "between teacher experience and student achievement." Id at 65. Among other
myths that Professor Greene uncovers is "the money myth." Id. at 8. Over the past thirty years,
spending per pupil has doubled, but student performance, as measured by the National
Assessment of Education Progress, has remained unchanged. Id. at 8-11.
61. Id. at 201 (emphasis added). But see id. at 201-02 (noting that while the American
Federation of Teachers asserts that "'private schools are ... less racially diverse' than public
schools," others argue that the private school voucher movement constitutes an attempt to escape
integration (citation omitted)).
62. Id. at 204.
63. Id. at 203-04 ("More minority students, however, is not the same as more integration. If
it were, then many Southern schools during the era of Jim Crow would have been wonderfully
integrated due to their very high proportion of minority students. By this standard, Brown v.
Board of Education was a terrible defeat for integration ....
Clearly, what we really mean by
integration is having a balanced mix of different racial groups rather than just greater numbers of
certain groups.").
64. See id. at 204 ("School systems themselves, whether public or private, are frequently
segregated, but [the method of measuring the distribution of racial groups] has no way to detect
segregation at that level.").
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65
private schools that demonstrate successful management of integration.
When parents have the option "to choose private schools, either with their own
funds or with vouchers, they are more likely to enroll their children in racially
mixed schools." 66 Taken together, such data suggests that opposition to school
choice, often led by proponents of67integration, may intensify the same resegregation trends that they criticize.
At the same time, many "schools are failing[-a]chievement is down,
violence is up, and no amount of money seems to insulate schools from these
trends. ' 68 One commentator puts it this way:
Fifty-eight percent of low-income 4th graders cannot read, and 61
percent of low-income 8th graders cannot do basic math. The
magnitude of this educational malpractice is staggering: Of the
roughly 20 million low-income children in K-12 schools, 12 million
aren't even learning the most elementary skills. These children have
little hope of mastering the
responsibilities of citizenship or the
69
rigors of global competition.

Educational malpractice occurs despite a rise in public education
expenditure by more than seven hundred percent, in inflation-adjusted dollars,
over the past fifty years.70 The dire educational and economic circumstances
facing many minorities, African Americans specifically, 71 have produced
skepticism about the efficacy of progressive and liberal educational
Doubt and dire
approaches, which reify this public school paradigm.
educational circumstance combine to legitimize school choice initiatives.
Accumulated evidence demonstrates that "when educators do succeed at
educating poor minority students up to national standards of proficiency, they
invariably use methods that are radically different and more intensive than
those employed in most American public schools. '7 3 It is, of course, "no

65. Id at 216 (noting "reports of significantly fewer racial conflicts in private schools").
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, LiberalHegemony? School Vouchers and the Future of
the Race, 68 MO. L. REV. 559, 594 (2003) [hereinafter Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony?]
(contesting the claim that school choice contributes to racial fragmentation and showing that,
instead, public schools contribute to racial isolation and subordination).
68. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 131, 156 (1995).
69.

Adam Meyerson, Forewordto SAMUEL CASEY CARTER, No EXcUSES: LESSONS FROM

21 HIGH-PERFORMING, HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS 1 (4th ed. 2000).
70.

See GREENE ET AL., supra note 59, at 10 fig. 1.1.

71. THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 12 ("By twelfth grade, on average,
black students are four years behind those who are white or Asian. Hispanics don't do much
better.").
72. Hutchison, LiberalHegemony?, supra note 67, at 562.
73. Kersten, supra note 8; see also Paul Tough, What It Takes To Make a Student, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006 (Mag.), at 44, 50 (finding, in the article that Kersten relied on, that the
charter schools "achieving the most impressive results with poor and minority students tend to
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accident that.. revolutionary schools" often operate "outside the traditional
public [school] system. 7 4 However worthy these new methods may be,
radical reform that places the interest of disadvantaged Americans at the center
(as opposed to the periphery) of debates about race and education remains an
unlikely event because of the inescapable effects of the exclusionary and
subordinating history of the common public school system, 75 as well as the
exclusionary present of America's system of 77
higher education.76 This process
combines to suppress the interest of outsiders.
Stanley Crouch illuminates this prospect:
The blues is a music about human will and human frailty, just as the
brilliance of the Constitution is that it recognizes grand human
possibility with the same clarity that it does human frailty, which is
why I say it has a tragic base. Just as the blues assumes that any man
or any woman can be unfaithful, the Constitution assumes that
nothing is innately good, that nothing is lasting-nothing, that is,
other than the perpetual danger of abused power.
Instead of accepting prevailing paradigms, it is time for a commitment to new
approaches that challenge critical assumptions connected to the rhetoric of
diversity, integration, and constitutional adjudication. It is crucial to closely
examine aspects of society and government that many believe to be innately
good in order to ensure that they are not masking abuses of power. Consistent
with this skepticism, I offer an inspection of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence
through the prism of Critical Race Theory.
This approach is fortified by classical-liberal reformist views of disparate
impact, and public choice analysis. When examining allegedly neutral areas of
law, Critical Race Theory is able to find "concepts of 'race' and racism always
already there. 79 Critical Race Theory concludes that "America's cultural
identity, values, and meanings cannot be separated from its past and present
social relations of domination and power."
Equally important, classicalliberal reformists contend that "policy-makers should be held responsible for
follow three practices": (1) "require many more hours of class time than a typical public school";
(2) set "explicit goals" for "classroom instruction and lesson planning"; and (3) "guide the
behavior, and even the values of... students by teaching.., character").
74.

THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 7.

75. See generally Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony?, supra note 67, at 582-89 (describing how
public schools embraced the ideology of racial and religious subordination).
76. See infra Part llI.B.3.
77. As defined herein, the term "outsiders" includes African Americans and members of
other disadvantaged groups.
78. STANLEY CROUCH, THE ALL-AMERICAN SKIN GAME, OR, THE DECOY OF RACE: THE
LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT, 1990-1994 10 (1995).

79. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV.
741, 750 (1994).
80. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2132 (1992).
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any discriminatory effects of their programs, regardless of a lack of evidence
of discriminatory intent." 8'
Public choice theory suggests that "[m]odern
democratic states have themselves become weapons in the war of all against
all, as rival interest groups compete with each other to capture government and
use it to seize and redistribute resources among themselves." ' 2 This process
includes the coercive transfer of private resources to the government, which
then relocates such resources as part of an effort to provide privileged modes
of education for members of preferred groups. 83 If this view is accepted, then
the centripetal tendency of the abusive process indicates that many policies,
"evaluated honestly and realistically, would be found to lack any true basis in
84
the public interest."
Merging Critical Race Theory, classical-liberal reformist views, and public
choice will not lead to a consensus. The search for consensus constitutes an
elusive search for what ultimately is an illusion because "consensus" views are
"'never checked against actual opinions, least of all those of the most
disadvantaged' people among us. Because public schools, universities, and
American democratic institutions are "constituted by elites who are charged
with policy deliberation," 8 6 and because "the predominant opinions . . . in
society ... reflect the views of the social and intellectual elites who have the
greatest access to public modes of expression,"8 7 both Critical Race Theory
proponents and classical-liberal reformists offer a corrective. They "believe
that laws should be examined from an outsider-premised fairness
perspective.
Fairness to outsiders means fairness to those groups such as
African Americans whose perspective and concerns "have not traditionally
been part of legal scholarship."8 9 Justice O'Connor and the Supreme Court
have given governmental units permission to implement race-conscious
initiatives that appear to transform the pursuit of racial justice into diversity
81. Harry Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage
Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 94
(1997) [hereinafter Hutchison, Towarda CriticalRace Reformist Conception].
82.

JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 (1993).

83. See id at 11-12 (noting that "all modem states operate vast redistributional welfare
systems . . . [and] exist[] in practice to satisfy the private preferences of collusive interest
groups").
84.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 382 (1981).

85.

Bernard Yack, Liberalism Without Illusions: An Introductionto Judith Shklar's Political

Thought, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE
POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 1, 8-9 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) (quoting JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 115 (1990)).
86. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 169 (2002).
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87. Yack, supra note 85, at 8-9.
88. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception, supra note 81, at 94
(emphasis added).
89. Mary 1. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REv.
683, 684 (1992).

1070

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 57:1059

rhetoric. In the sections that follow, I argue that paradox shadows such
adjudication. Part II examines the transformation of the nation's presumed
commitment to racial justice into evolving standards of diversity. Part III
concentrates on the contested jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor.
II.

FROM RACIAL JUSTICE TO DIVERSITY

Diversity as a "highly individualized" treatment acceptable to the Supreme
Court has apparently attained new potency, 90 but this move has not occurred in
a vacuum. Diversity in the United States "is itself remarkably diverse-and
dynamic. Like a blastula of cells undergoing mitosis, American society
constantly proliferates new divisions and differentiations. Some of this merely
reconfigures the familiar, reshuffling old decks, but much of it creates
Diversity as a goal operates as a
unprecedented forms of social life." '
component of the new cosmopolitanism, which presumes that deep differences,
whether racial, religious, or ideological, are unimportant. 92 Larry Alexander
reveals how "cosmopolitanism ...tends to homogenize and shallow out the

various ways of life" because "[i]f there are many paths to truth or salvation,
then little is at stake in finding a path.",93 Therefore, appreciating both the
adverse effects of societal discrimination and the necessity to engage in serious
efforts to eradicate the continuing effects of white supremacy as part of a core
struggle for racial equality94 appears lost in the pursuit of the superficial. For
some, this move has been exacerbated by the formation of a society comprised
of highly individualistic people who either collectively or individually appear
to be motivated by a bundle of incompatible preferences. They can be
described as "[u]ncommitted, restless .... ever-open, .

.

. 'conversion prone'

and therefore congenitally ready to be converted and reconverted ad
nauseam-without the conviction that would stop the dizzying spin and allow
them to be at home somewhere." 95 Diversity as cosmopolitanism appears to be
consistent with several possibilities, including the possibility that some
individuals might be captivated by Nietzschean self-mastery and the will to
power. 96 Others may be consumed by the pursuit of postmodern identity

90. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
91. PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 3 (2003).
92. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 169
(2005) (noting that this "conception of liberalism admits to being itself a way of life," with "a
diversity of religions, associations, occupations, ideas, and so forth... from which to choose").
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 40, at 263-64 (asserting the view that a central purpose of
integration was combating racism).
95. Os GUINNESS, THE CALL: FINDING AND FULFILLING THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF YOUR
LIFE 10 (2003).
96. Id. at 22.
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construction or, in a purely suburban move, the body.97 This contemporary
obsession with the body may crumple into
98 an "enduring fascination" with
cookbooks, health foods, and aromatherapy.
How did the nation exchange its commitment to racial justice for diversity as
a cosmopolitan objective? Provisional answers are available. Professor
Adams establishes that integration was once seen as a "vital structural
99
component" of an effort to eradicate racial segregation and white supremacy.
Today, some argue that integration is synonymous with a process whereby
members of minority groups "'adopt[] the customs and attitudes of the
prevailing culture." 0 0 Adams insists that "the present-day integrationist
vision ... oversimplifies the emotional discomfort and identity sacrifice that
are associated with integration." 10 1 She argues that "[i]ntegration no longer
captivates the progressive imagination" as a device for "eliminating racial
inequality.' ' 1 2 Professor Michael Selmi's intuition suggests that only rare
voices persist in "advocating for the importance of integrated institutions, [and]
those voices are dwarfed by the critiques of integration and the contemporary
affinity for choice." '10 3 He also suggests the move to discount integration may
reinvigorate de facto segregation.
Whatever its presumed advantages may
be, "integration has fallen deeply among our social priorities among blacks and
whites alike. Diversity, on the other hand, is everywhere, and' 10one
would be
5
hard pressed to find a devoted critic of the concept of diversity."
It is clear that America's public institutions have decisively endorsed the
rhetoric of diversity. The question, "What is diversity?" like Hart's famous
question, "What is law?"'10 6 has been asked and answered on many occasions
without a sound resolution. The ancient world did not think that diversity was
a positive ideal. 10 7 Indeed, it can be shown that "this ideal, [now] so familiar at
the turn of the new millennium, has no real antecedent in American
thought. ' 1° 8 Thus, public law's pursuit of it is "truly unprecedented."' 9 The
question becomes: does the move to both reify diversity and diminish
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Adams, supra note 40, at 263-64.
Id. at 264 (using Dictionary.com's definition of "assimilation").

101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. Selmi, supra note 43, at 75 (footnote omitted).
104. See id.
105. Id. (footnote omitted).
106. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (2d ed. 1994).
107. SCHUCK, supra note 91, at 40-41 ("Neither Herodotus nor subsequent historians,
however, have identified societies valuing diversity as a positive ideal to be celebrated and
actively and collectively pursued. Most often, diversity was seen as a potentially dangerous
condition that threatened social turmoil and hence must be carefully controlled.").
108. Id. at41.
109. Id.
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integration as a serious goal allow policy-makers to ignore society's central
role in entrenching racial inequality?
III.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: FROM GRUTTER TO THE FUTURE

A. Prolegomenato Grutter
Establishing the deep structure behind the Court's recent decisions in
GrutterII and ParentsInvolved"2 requires an examination of America's Equal

Protection Clause platform.
Professors David Bernstein and Ilya Somin
maintain that "[n]o line of cases enhanced the prestige of the Supreme Court as
much as Brown v. Board of Education and other decisions vindicating the
rights of African Americans." ' " 3 Before achieving iconic status, Brown "was
criticized by some prominent liberal legal scholars for overruling the
democratic process. ' 4 Today, Brown has come under attack by "revisionist
scholars associated with the political left"' 1 5 who believe that commentators
have "vastly exaggerated the importance of Brown to the African-American
freedom struggle."1" 6 If this intuition is correct, adjudication may promise
more than it delivers.
In Brown, the Supreme Court ordered a segregated school system to be
dismantled with "all deliberate speed."' " 7 Brown led to a series of opinions
culminating in a decision requiring school districts to terminate segregated
school systems immediately." 18 As the Court later described, "[i]t was not the
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the
basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in

110. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 40, at 275 ("My vision of integration is radical ....
[I]t
recognizes that racial segregation is the root or source of racial inequality and that racial
integration is the only adequate antidote. Racial segregation structures, maintains, and
perpetuates inequality across virtually every indicia of social, political, educational and economic
well being.").
111. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (allowing race conscious admissions
grounded in the notion that educational diversity constitutes a compelling interest that is narrowly
tailored to the government's interest).
112. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007)
(disallowing reliance on race as a basis for assigning students in order to achieve racial balance
within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole).
113. David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, JudicialPower and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114
YALE L.J. 591, 593 (2004) (book review) (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
118. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per
curiam) ("Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every school district is to
terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.").
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1954." 119 Thus, "[o]nce there has been a showing of deliberate segregation of
schools, school authorities must develop a plan which will provide immediate
relief."' 20 Although there is now a fundamental disagreement between the
liberal and conservative wings of the Supreme Court about what Brown
requires,' 2 ' it can be argued that courts could only order desegregation "if there
has been a showing of purposeful segregation."' 122 Brown 1,123 Brown 11,124 and

subsequent school-desegregation decisions of the Supreme Court do not
require all public schools to be racially integrated. 125 "Rather, the decisions
require that public schools not be racially segregated.' 2 6 This calculus
fortifies the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. 127 De jure
segregation requires some purposeful act by government authorities, whereas
de facto segregation depends primarily on housing and migration patterns that

are not directly connected to evidence of purposeful governmental action.128
When attention turns to affirmative action, problems arise because it is likely
that no one has ever satisfactorily defined the term.129 One commentator
writes that affirmative action, "[t]o its supporters, [has] meant racial and social
justice, a compensation for past and present discrimination."' 30 As thus
conceived, affirmative action, like integration, "would eradicate the advantages
whites had accrued through segregation.' 13'
Affirmative action's critics
charge that it "has only perpetuated the problem of discrimination while
creating a host of new problems."' 32 The intensity of this debate is fueled by a
clash among three conflicting conceptions of discrimination: intentional,
societal, and unconscious racism. Conventional constitutional adjudication
holds that remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination is a
119. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007)
(emphasis added).
120. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 764.
121. Compare Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting "that the
Constitution permits local communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not
require them to do so"), with id. at 2768 (majority opinion) (arguing that the way to "remove[]
the vestiges of past segregation . . . is to stop assigning students on a racial basis" (citation

omitted)).
122. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 764.
123. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
124. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
125. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 765.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (explaining that while de jure segregation is actionable, de facto desegregation does
not require judicial intervention).
129. Steven Yates, What Went Wrong with Affirmative Action (And Why It Never CouldHave
Gone Right), LEWROCKWELL.COM, Jan. 25, 2003, http://www.lewrockwell.com/yates/yates70.

html.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Adams, supra note 40, at 272.
Yates, supra note 129, at 1.
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compelling governmental interest sufficient to withstand the strict scrutiny
standard,1- 3 whereas societal discrimination cannot withstand strict scrutiny
analysis.1 34 Nor has the Court or the nation embraced Charles Lawrence's
path-breaking analysis showing how persistent, unconscious racism hinders the
progress of minorities,135 particularly African Americans.
Unless provable evidence of intentional discrimination can be found,
affirmative action as a voluntary remedy, calibrated to compensate for the
present effects of past racial injustice, fails to shelter race-conscious decisionmaking. This is true despite the contested possibility that public schools are
more segregated today than they were prior to Brown, and despite the disputed
prospect that "[c]urrent resegregation trends threaten thirty years of
progress."1 36 Thus, government policy-makers who implement voluntary raceconscious policies, either to achieve their own interest or the interest of others,
emphasize diversity and hope this interest can be found adequate to withstand
strict scrutiny. 137 It is possible, and I think very likely, that this move confirms
Derrick Bell's observation that "the concept of diversity
. . . is a serious
38
distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice.",
Given Derrick Bell's skepticism, Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion should
be considered warily. Reviewing the disputed racial classifications under strict
scrutiny, the Court had to determine whether the University of Michigan Law
School's classification scheme was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest. 139 For the first time, a majority of the Court embraced
133. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (instructing that racial balancing
should only be used as a solution to a de jure constitutional violation); see also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) ("But we have never held that the only governmental use of
race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination.").
134. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) ("[T]he purpose of helping certain groups . . . perceived as victims of 'societal
discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons ... who
bear no responsibility ... ").
135. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987) ("Traditional notions of intent do not
reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can
be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously
sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and
uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and wishes." (citation omitted)).
136. Eboni S. Nelson, Parents Involved & Meredith: A Prediction Regarding the
(Un) ConstitutionalityofRace-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, 84 DEN. U. L. REV. 293, 297
(2006). But see THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 6 (directly contesting this claim
by stating "[s]chools are not becoming 'resegregated'; they cannot, in any case, magically
become racially balanced given existing residential patterns").
137. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2755 (2007) ("[B]oth school districts assert additional interests . . . to justify their race-based
assignments.... Each school district argues that educational and broader socialization benefits
flow from a racially diverse learning environment ... ").
138. Derrick Bell, Diversity'sDistractions, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1622 (2003).
139. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
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diversity as a compelling interest that satisfies strict scrutiny. 4 ° Citing
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.141 with approval, Justice O'Connor held that
strict scrutiny is required because, absent searching inquiry, the courts "have
no way to determine what 'classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority
or simply racial politics.' ' 142 Evidently, "the distinction between illegitimate
and benign policies remain[s] crucial,"' 43 allowing "race-based action [when]
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest."' 144 Justice O'Connor
made clear that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental
action," 1and
accordingly, courts "must take relevant differences into
45
account."'
B. Toward a CriticalRace View of the Cathedral

Charged with the resolution of a dispute at the heart of the intersection of
race and higher education, the Grutter opinion represents an extension of a
quarter-century (from 1978 to 2003) of wrangling "concerning ,,146
government
policies that were designed to create racial diversity in schools.
Justice
O'Connor's resolution of the pending question-whether diversity designed to
create a critical mass of underrepresented students provides sufficient
educational benefits to constitute a compelling purpose within the meaning of
strict scrutiny 147-required a review of a constellation of issues that have
plagued affirmative-action preference programs for some time. She endorses
Justice Powell's view that a diverse student body is a compelling state interest
that can justify racial preferences in admissions 148 when the university's policy
"d[oes] not purport to remedy past discrimination," but instead endeavors "to
include students who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from
that of members of groups which have not been the victims of such
discrimination.' ' 149 One interpretation of Justice Powell's Bakke decision is
that "the Constitution [only] forbid[s] blatant quotas ...but allow[s] more

subtle systems of racial discrimination."' 50 Justice O'Connor accepts that the
achievable benefits of diversity must be the product of a narrowly tailored
140. Id.at 325.
141. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
142. Grutter,539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
143. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 95.
144. Grutter,539 U.S. at 327.
145. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
146. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 807.
147. Grutter,539 U.S. at 327-29.
148. Id.at 325.
149. Id.at319.
150. Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's PragmaticApproach to Civil Rights, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 249, 275 (2004) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-320
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
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approach that appears more or less subtle. Narrow tailoring apparently
requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives." 151 Though the dissent questions whether Michigan seriously
considered race-neutral alternatives,' 52 Justice O'Connor accepts the following
propositions: (1) "today's increasingly global marketplace can only be
developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints"; 153 (2) "[t]he Law School's educational judgment that diversity is
essential to its educational mission is one to which [the Court should]
defer";1 54 (3) "given the important purpose of public education and the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in [America's] constitutional
tradition"; 155 (4) 'education . . . is the very foundation of good
citizenship' ; and (5) law schools, as training grounds for the nation's
leaders, must have "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry," purchased by
providing a pathway that is 1"visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals
57
of every race and ethnicity."'
Not everyone agrees. Justice Kennedy asserts that Justice O'Connor's
decision, premised on deference to the university's good faith, departs from
any meaningful strict scrutiny, and accordingly, "the Court lacks authority to
approve" of racially based admission policies, "even in this modest, limited
way."' 158 As we have seen, evidence exists showing that African American
students thrive in racially homogenous environments, such as those provided
by Historically Black Colleges. 159 The persistence of such evidence provokes
suspicion regarding the Supreme Court's ready acceptance of the putative
benefits derived from a critical mass of students, including the educational
returns resulting from diversity. Benefits purportedly include "cross-racial
understanding," "breaking down racial stereotypes," and making classroom
discussions "livelier, more spirited, and .. . more enlightening."1 60 Such
claims are not falsifiable and hence remain unverifiable. The relevant question
from an outsider-fairness approach is whether these purported benefits deliver
a tangible return to black students and other minorities or, alternatively, imply
151. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
152. Compare id.at 340 ("[T]he Law School sufficiently considered workable race-neutral
alternatives.), with id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court... is willing to be satisfied by
the Law School's profession of its own good faith.").
153. Id. at 330 (majority opinion).
154. Id. at 328.
155. Id. at 329.
156. Id.at 331 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
157. Idat 332.
158. Id.at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., id at 364-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the "evidence that racial . ..heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black
students").
160. Id.at 330 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that benefits are nowhere to be found. Failure to address this question, when
coupled with data suggesting that black students thrive in a nondiverse
environment and that public schools disfavor black students and other minority
students, supports the inference that the interests of outsiders are irrelevant to
the Court and the university's admission calculus.
Whether O'Connor, Kennedy, or the university is correct, decision-making
within the race-conscious arena is tainted by paradox. For present purposes, I
intend to focus on four hypotheses connected with O'Connor's opinion in
Grutter: (1) the prospect that although outright racial balancing remains
impermissible, the goal of attaining a critical mass of students can nonetheless
transform an admissions program into an acceptable form of racial balancing
so long as it is not obvious about the use of race; (2) the possibility that the
doctrine of strict scrutiny can be newly interpreted to permit race-conscious
redress for societal discrimination, which signals that Gratz and Parents
Involved may have been wrongly decided; (3) the likelihood that Grutter can
be understood as an effort to conceal the law school's exclusionary policies;
and (4) that critics who praise Justice O'Connor's decision in Grutter while
expressing contempt for the Court's subsequent opinion in Parents Involved
should understand that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Gratz established
the foundation for the latter decision.
1. Racial Balancingandthe Non-Obvious Use ofRace?
First, compare Justice O'Connor's reliance on
161 the Michigan Law School's
good faith operation of its admissions program
with her determination that
outright racial balancing is impermissible. 12 Based on (1) Justice O'Connor's
assertion that "the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless
of race or ethnicity"; 63 (2) Justice Powell's determination that an admissions
policy with racial quotas is impermissible; 64 and (3) that the percentage of
African American students admitted by the University of Michigan's law
school mirrors, almost precisely, the percentage of black applicants, 16 it is
possible to infer the following proposition: the goal of attaining a critical mass
of underrepresented students can transform a program into an acceptable form

161. Id. at 336-37 (accepting the conclusion that "[s]ome attention to numbers ... does not
transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota," particularly when race is used as a plus

factor).
162. Id. at 329-30 (accepting that "outright racial balancing ...
is patently
unconstitutional").
163. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
164. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (opinion ofPowell, J.).
165. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the precise
correlation between the percentage of the law school's pool of applicants who are members of
three minority groups (African American, Hispanic, and Native American) and the percentage of
the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups).
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of racial balancing so long as the admissions policy does not obviously focus
on race. 166 One way of not obviously focusing on race is to use race as a "plus
factor" that constitutes 'only one element in a range of factors"' enabling the
institution to attain a diverse student body. 67 The option of enrolling a critical
mass of minorities through a form of individualized treatment supplies
constitutional cover for what would otherwise represent impermissible racial
balancing. 168 But as Professors Nowak and Rotunda suggest, this is not
without risk for members of minority groups. 169 "When the government
distributes benefits under a strict quota system," it ultimately "burdens
members of minority races" by limiting their participation in society's
institutions, and may in due course limit their rights
by accepting and
70
augmenting "the bias of members of the majority race."'
Professor Rodriguez forcefully argues that
individualized consideration does not restrain [admissions officers']
race-based judgments-it unleashes them.
Individualized
consideration gives state actors the power not just to notice race, as
[a] mechanical interpretation does, but also to define race, on a caseby-case basis. This power means race 171will be treated as more
relevant to some applicants than to others.
Such a move "creates a stereotyping danger" and "demands that people
perform their ethnicity for admissions officers."' 17 2 "These performances help
shape the ways minorities see themselves and their role in the United States,"
and provide a "powerful incentive[ for minority applicants]
to play the script
' 73
that the dominant culture has written for its minorities."'
2. Remedying Societal Discriminationin the Mirrorof Strict Scrutiny?
The second paradox is connected with Justice O'Connor's acceptance of the
Court's long-held conclusion that remedying the legacy of societal

166. See Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121
HARV. L. REv. 104,104 (2007).
167. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324, 334 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-16 (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
168. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276, 280 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(finding impermissible a race-conscious admissions policy that lacks individualized
consideration); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2746 (2007) (disallowing the school districts' approaches as a form of balancing).
169. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note ], at 791.
170. Id.(footnotes omitted).
171. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Against Individualized Consideration, 5 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-18, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-- 148352.
172. ld.at 6-7.
173. Id.at 7-8.
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discrimination does not comply with the mandates of strict scrutiny 17 4 because
75
it "cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster."'
It is possible, of course, that she now disagrees, but trapped by her own
language in earlier cases, 176 she may find it difficult to acknowledge the
modification of her position. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist found such a
change. He concluded that Justice O'Connor and the Court had decided to
vitiate the strict scrutiny standard in favor of leniency when the governmental
unit could adduce evidence that race was being deployed in good faith. 177 This
move may implicate either an alteration in the substance of the compelling
interest prong or the infusion of leniency with respect to the narrow-tailoring
component of the strict scrutiny test. Perhaps, concluding that her a priori
understanding of strict scrutiny is impoverished by her ex post inspection of
the effects of the Court's standard of review, Justice O'Connor now believes
that societal discrimination is sufficiently delineated to allow reasonable
observers to enforce race-conscious redress. One way of facilitating this move
is to lower the standard of review either directly or indirectly. If so, an
intriguing (but difficult to prove) possibility emerges, namely, that Grutter
actually stands for the proposition that public school districts and public
universities are entitled to voluntarily remedy the intergenerational effects of
societal discrimination. 18 It is possible to speculate that earlier precedent
precluding this move has been overruled covertly without the Court giving
linguistic expression to its newly discovered leniency in the face of the
governmental unit's good faith claims.
If this is the implied meaning of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, it
follows that one view of the cathedral suggests that Parents Involved and Gratz
were wrongly decided. 17 9 In both cases the government dispensed with

174. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24 (2003) (endorsing Justice Powell's
proposition that neither an interest in "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities" in a profession, nor "remedying societal discrimination," justify race-conscious
decision-making (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[A] governmental agency's interest in remedying 'societal'
discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.").
176. See, e.g., id.
177. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 365 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
178. To her credit, Justice Ginsburg, whose opinion Justice Breyer joined, states the obvious.
See Grutter,539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("It is well documented that conscious and
unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impeding
realization of our highest values and ideals.").
179. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753-54
("Like the University of Michigan undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, the plans here 'do
not provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants' but instead rely on racial
classifications in a 'nonindividualized, mechanical' way." (internal citation omitted)).
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individualized treatment in the sense articulated in Bakke.' 80 Instead, the
government directly supplied, or claimed to supply, group-based remedies
premised on membership in racial or ethnic groups that have suffered from
8
past racial disadvantages made tangible by current racial isolation.' '
Following Justice Stevens' understanding 1 2 and Dworkin's imprimatur, 183 one
might argue that the university in Gratz and the school districts in Parents
Involved voluntarily and legitimately imposed racial balancing as a remedy for
societal discrimination,1 84 or as a device for eradicating the effects of public
school segregation.' 85 Advocates of the use of race-conscious remedies might
conclude that such a move could operate consistently with Justice Ginsburg's
intuition,' 8 6 and if explained adequately, might facilitate Professor Lawrence's
understanding of
unconscious racism, which diminishes the necessity of
87
proving intent.'
Conceivably, this approach would support either of two remedial avenues:
First, court-imposed remedies crafted to eliminate exclusionary admissions,
educate outsiders in a serious way, and diminish the governmental unit's
obsession with status; or second, judicial leniency sustained by evidence of a
governmental unit's good-faith attempt to eradicate the vestiges of
discrimination, which would enable the court to permit the unit to impose
remedies on itself. But, even if attempts to sustain race-conscious remedies for
societal discrimination in Gratz and Parents Involved are now seen as
180. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (opinion of Powell, J.)
(articulating that diversity as a justification cannot sustain a selection system in which members
of particular ethnic groups are guaranteed places solely on the basis of race). See also Parents
Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753-54 ("[U]nder each [school district] plan when race comes into play,
it is decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in
Grutter; it is the factor."); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-72 (2003) ("[T]he University's
policy, which automatically distributes 20 points.., to every single 'underrepresented minority'
application solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored .... ").
181. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753 (describing the difference between the
school's plans in Parents Involved and in Grutter, where the admissions program "focused on
each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a particular racial group," and the
"classification of applicants by race . . . was only as part of a 'highly individualized, holistic
review' (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337)).
182. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the
Court's 1968 approval of a Massachusetts statute mandating racial integration in that state's
school system).
183. See Dworkin, supra note 9, at 92 ("No one doubts that avoiding academic ghettos is a
desirable goal .... How can the Constitution be read to deny [states] that opportunity?").
184. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing America's
"overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality [that]
remain painfully evident in our communities and schools").
185. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
187. See generally Lawrence, supra note 135 (arguing, in part, that prejudices exist
independent of overt racist motives, and that "traditional notions of intent" are inadequate for
addressing societal discrimination).
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permissible, and however unassailable the outcome in Grutter may be, the
argument justifying its end result-race-conscious decision-making aimed at
ensuring diversity-becomes questionable. This is because the law school's
policy was not offered as a remedy for societal or intentional discrimination,
and hence it is difficult to understand why its policy should be entitled to
lenient scrutiny. Instead, the law school justified its admissions program on
grounds that its policy provided benefits that accrued predominantly to the
overall educational process,' 8 and therefore largely to the benefit of nonminority students-those who do not come from disfavored backgrounds. If
this inspection is correct, Grutter would likely fail lenient scrutiny analysis
because the law school's good faith claims are not premised on the provision
of tangible benefits to members of racially disadvantaged groups.
3. Does Grutter Conceal ExclusionaryPolicies?
Third, if Grutter truly precludes facially obvious racial balancing, then this
case can be seen as an effort to conceal the law school's exclusionary policies
and defend its elite status within the academic pantheon. Justice O'Connor
asserts that the Constitution "'derive[s] content by an interpretive process of
inclusion and exclusion,"' 189 but it is impossible to overlook the fact that the
law school's basic admissions policy-predicated on the LSAT exam and the
applicant's undergraduate grade point average-is designed to disfavor
African Americans and other outsiders, 190 and appears to provide few benefits
to the citizens of Michigan.' 91 Here we should recall Edmund Husserl's claim
that "[w]hen someone uses some particular linguistic expression, we have to
distinguish between what the use of the expression ... intimates and what the
expression itself means."' 92 Although the petitioner's expert witness intimated
"that race is not the predominant factor in the Law School's admissions
calculus,"' 93 disadvantaged minorities would have comprised less than five
percent of the entering class in the year 2000 "instead of the actual figure of
14.5 percent" but for the challenged race-preference policy. 94 Stated another
way, this means that more than two-thirds of the students from
underrepresented minority groups ultimately admitted were in fact initially

188. See Grutter, 538 U.S. at 314-16 (2003).
189. Id.at 327 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960)).
190. See id.at 320.
191. See id at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In 2002,
graduates of the [University of Michigan] Law School made up less than 6% of applicants to the
Michigan bar, even though the Law School's graduates constitute nearly 30% of all law students
graduating in Michigan." (citation omitted)).
192. MACINTYRE, EDITH STEIN, supra note 54, at 42 (characterizing Husserl's consideration
of language and meaning).
193. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320.
194. Id.

1082

Catholic UniversityLaw Review

[Vol. 57:1059

excluded. 195 They were the tip of the iceberg. The law school's policy seeks
to valorize a system of admissions that improves the overall educational
process via diversity. Comprehensively understood, however, this system also
sustains and defends the educational benefits available for privileged white
students, administrators and facult, and perhaps preserves legacy preferences
or other devices favored by elites. Coextensively, evidence accumulates that
the racial diversity the University of Michigan prefers may impair learning
among black students.1 97 Nevertheless, contrary to the skepticism toward
governmental racial classifications that she exhibited in Adarand,198 Justice
O'Connor, in Grutter, deferred to the good-faith educational judgment of the
very university that created the exclusionary admissions policy in the first
place. 199

Nor is complicity in this process restricted to the university. The State of
Michigan's education system is an organic holistic structure wherein the
university and the law school as flagship institutions operate at the apex of this
structure. This arrangement is funded by coercive transfers (taxes) from all of
Michigan's citizens.
Deference properly understood, consciously or
unconsciously, promotes an educational scheme that eviscerates adequate
educational opportunities for outsiders. This system maintains public schools
that operate as "dropout factories ' 200 while impairing enrolled students'
educational performance and cognitive abilities. Deliberately or inadvertently,
this approach is complemented by a university system seasoned with a touch of
affirmative action that is standardized to camouflage failing public schools and
the university's own participation in subordination. This process, taken as a
whole, may provide evidence of the presence of derogatory racial stereotypes,
perhaps repressed from consciousness, and prevents the law school from
admitting °1its intent to publicly proclaim its preference for Caucasian
students.
From a Critical Race Theory perspective, deference to law school
administrators-like deference to the university's co-conspirator, the state
education system-materializes as a paradox that preserves racial
disadvantages suffered by black Americans.
Purchased with eternal
surveillance, Critical Race analysis uncovers racism within the law school's
admissions policy. Classical-liberal reformists, animated by the determination
that policy-makers should be held responsible for the adverse effects of their
programs and initiatives, regardless of a lack of evidence of discriminatory
195.

See id.

196. See id.
at 368 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

society).

See id. at 364.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1995).
Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence, supra note 135, at 340 (describing examples of unconscious racism in
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intent, find that disparate impact lurks in the background of the law school's
admission policy. 2 °2 Here the case is much stronger because "no modem law
school can claim ignorance of the poor performance of blacks, relatively
speaking, on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law
schools continue to use the test" 20 3 and thereby control admission.
Aside from classical-liberal reformist theories of disparate impact, public
choice scholars show that, whether in private or in public, individuals are
motivated by self-interest. 2°4
Coherent with this perception, Professor
Lawrence argues that "the greatest stumbling block to any proposal to modify
the intent requirement [in discrimination cases] will not be its lack of
jurisprudential efficacy but the perception among those who give substance to
our jurisprudence that it will operate against their self-interest. 205 Professor
Lawrence also acknowledges Derrick Bell's view that "the interests of blacks
in achieving racial equality have been accommodated only when they have
converged with the interests of powerful whites: The legal establishment has
not responded to civil rights claims
that threaten the superior societal status of
20 6
whites."
class
middle
and
upper
The interests of privileged individuals are expressed in the university's
admissions policy, and adducible evidence sustains this conclusion. Grutter
and Gratz came before the courts in a peculiar posture. Black and Hispanic
students, seeking to defend affirmative action, won federal court permission to
intervene in both Gratz and Grutter.20 7 The university embraced the
intervenors' participation based on the contention that "[b]oth the intervenors
and the university are fighting for the same thing: the preservation of a diverse
student body.",20 ' The credibility of the university's purported embrace is
vitiated by noting that the "intervenor students plan[ned] to offer an argument
that the university itself dispute[d]: that the university needs to have
affirmative-action policies in place to remedy its own racial discrimination. 20 9

202. See, e.g., Preston C. Green, III, Can Title VI Prevent Law Schools From Adopting
Admissions Practices That DiscriminateAgainst African-Americans?, 24 S.U. L. REv. 237, 25455 (1997) (analyzing the application of disparate impact theory as applied to law school
admissions).
203. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369-70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern
State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 309, 310 (2002).
205. Lawrence, supranote 135, at 387.
206. Id. (citing Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980)).
207. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).
208. 6th Circuit CourtSays Black andLatino Students CanJoin Michigan Affirmative Action
Cases, BLACK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 19, 1999, at 108 (quoting "Elizabeth Barry,
University of Michigan associate vice-president and vice general counsel, [who] praised the
[Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals] ruling.").
209. Peter Schmidt, Minority Students Win Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking
Affirmative Action, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Sept. 3, 1999, at A68.
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Successfully charging the University of Michigan as well as the State of
Michigan with intentional discrimination might well have altered the dynamics
of the case, the intensity of judicial scrutiny, possibly the outcome in Gratz,
and the defensibility of the Court's Grutter decision in the court of public
opinion. The latter point is relevant because the Grutter holding, approving
racial preferences, was effectively overruled by the voters of the state of
Michigan. 21 Furthermore, a successful indictment could have placed the
university and the state under judicial supervision, complete with courtimposed remedies that differed in a substantial way from the university's
preferred status-enhancing policies.
In addition, "there is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and
other measures to 'predict' academic performance is a poor substitute for a
system that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study
of law." 211 My own experience leading a program providing an alternative
pathway to law school matriculation 2 1 persuades me that an admissions
system wedded solely to test scores, and perhaps "poisoned by numerous
exceptions to 'merit,' 21 3 can only be defended on the basis of subordination.
Thus, the law school's sustained allegiance to measures that it knows (and
hence intends to) produce racially skewed results that persistently disfavor
black and Hispanic students should not be entitled to deference;' that is,
unless the Court and the nation are prepared to endorse gormless procedures
and untrustworthy rhetoric exemplified by the law school's participation in
compartmentalization. Compartmentalization constitutes a mental process that
enables the law school to sustain its asserted commitment to racial justice,
while ignoring the exclusionary impact that its less-than-benign admissions
policies impose on African Americans and other minorities.
The law school's selective admissions policy, inescapably linked to the
"desire to select racial winners and losers"2 15 and flavored with a token
commitment to diversity, cannot be convincingly separated from the state's
refusal to open its educational doors in a serious way to Michigan's
210. Kimberly Chow, Michigan Votes to Stop Affirmative Action in State Universities on
Tuesday, YALE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 2006, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/
printarticle/18868 ("Michigan voters passed a state referendum banning the use of affirmative
action ...").
211. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367 (2003) (Thomas, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
212. From 1989 to 1993, I led a summer program at the University of Detroit Mercy School
of Law, which allowed talented individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds to enroll in the law
school after passing a pre-admissions course.
213. Grutter,539 U.S. at 367-68 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. See id.See also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2778 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that the Supreme Court does not typically
defer to state entities in assessing whether a given practice complies with its compelling interest
test).
215. Grutter,539 U.S. at 369 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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disadvantaged citizens. 2 16 This calculus sustains the interest and superior
status of privileged white students and upper-middle class white
administrators. 2 17
The law school's preferred approach indicates that
underrepresented students should not be prized because they are excellent
students who might benefit from a good education or because they might assist
the nation in fulfilling its commitment to the eradication of inequality, but
because they provide benefits to others; they assist the law school in
maintaining both its prestige and status by creating the appropriate laboratory
conditions required to educate non-minority students about the nuances
associated with different ethnicities. A focus on prestige and status is by its
very nature exclusive and not inclusive. To exclude means to shut out persons
from place, society, and privilege or otherwise make it impossible for
disfavored individuals and groups to attend or succeed. 2 1 The annual U.S.
News & World Report survey shows that law school rankings are enhanced by
the number of individuals they exclude. 219 Thus, sincere efforts aimed at
sustaining an institution's status via its admissions process must be
exclusionary at its core.
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor and the Court defer to an educational
process that is plumped up by a magician's conjuring trick: add a dollop of
color so long as the exclusionary status-enhancing benefits of the institution
remain intact. In the meantime, African Americans and Hispanics reap a bitter
harvest of adversity connected to poor public schools: high attrition rates at
college and at law school, 22° high failure rates on bar examinations, 22 1 and

216. Id. at 368-69 (discussing some alternatives to the school's current admissions policy of
"selective admissions").
217. See Lawrence, supra note 135, at 387.
218. See, e.g., 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 508 (2d ed. 1989).
219. See Special Report: America's Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 7-14, 2008, at 66 (showing that schools with the lower 2007 acceptance rates
are the higher ranked law schools).
220. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the CorporateLaw Firm, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 1755, 1771-75 & tbls. 3-5 (2006) (showing significant minority attrition "at every stage
of the educational process"). According to Professor Sander, "Hispanics drop out of high school
far more frequently than do whites, blacks, or Asians[, and i]n law school and on the bar .... they
have very high attrition rates." Id. at 1773. In terms of black students, "the largest sources of...
attrition come from college entrants not graduating and law school matriculates not entering the
bar." Id. at 1774. Blacks make up to eight percent of entering law students, but make up only
between five to six percent of new lawyers. Id.
221. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, "Active Liberty" and JudicialPower: What Should Courts Do to
Promote Democracy?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1827, 1840 (2006) (book review) ("[Fifty percent] of
African-American law students from a 1991 Law School Admissions Council sample either fail
to graduate within five years of admission (41%) or graduate but do not take the bar (9%). The
comparable rate for white students is 24% with 17% failing to graduate and 7% failing to take the
bar." (citing Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black
Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1844 (2005) (footnote omitted))). According to Professor
Somin, Ayres and Brooks conclude that some racial disparities emerge, because "law schools,

1086

Catholic UniversityLaw Review

[Vol. 57:1059

high attrition rates at large corporate law firms. 22 2 The combination of these
effects, whether intentional or inadvertent, whether conscious or unconscious,
serves to diminish the number of African American and Hispanic lawyers
practicing in the State of Michigan and the United States. Because the State of
Michigan's educational hierarchy instantiates policies that preserve educational
malpractice in Michigan's elementary and high schools,223 this constitutes
proof of the state's complicity in an educational system, including university
admissions, that validates minority inferiority. Overlooking the state's
responsibility for this move allows diversity rhetoric to transform itself into a
majoritarian device that blurs and flavors an ongoing process of exclusion that
affirms that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policies
cannot be seen as part of a benign program. A more plausible explanation
implies that its race-conscious admissions program is motivated by notions of
racial inferiority and simple racial politics.
A lengthy inspection is not required in order to discover the ill-fated future
destination of diversity rhetoric. Since Grutter,institutions of higher education
have transformed diversity and its correlative objectives 22 4 into
cosmopolitanism. Diversity programs have shifted their focus away from
increasing minority access to education toward serving the broader and more
abstract goal of promoting campus diversity. 225 One program, aimed at
encouraging students from underrepresented backgrounds to participate in
science and engineering, is instructive:
Of the 20 students in the program, 10 were Hispanic, with six
coming from colleges in Puerto Rico and another bom and raised in
Peru. Five were black, with two bom in Africa and two others the
children of Jamaican immigrants.... Of the three white participants,
one was a young man who routinely identifies himself on
as "African-American" because his father was raised in
applications
22 6
Egypt.
Deborah Jones Merritt explains that courts and policy-makers, when and if
they act, are quite willing to ensure that "[s]elective colleges have just the
'right' mix of white and minority students, enough African American and
Latino students to give the campus an urbane, cosmopolitan air without
threatening the white campus majority. ' 227 It appears that society's elites
seeking to maximize diversity, admit 'high risk' black students without informing them of the
high probability that they might fail to complete their studies." Id.
222. Sander, supranote 220, at 1820.
223. See infra Part 11I.C.
224. See Peter Schmidt, From 'Minority' to 'Diversity,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), Feb. 3, 2006, at A24.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Deborah Jones Merritt, Brown's Legacy: The Promises and Pitfalls of JudicialRelief
56 NEGRo EDUC. REv. 51, 53 (2005).
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demand that encounters with race (particularly when encountering blacks and
Hispanics) remain consistent with the notions of minority inferiority and elite
privilege.
The transmutation of diversity programs into a form of
cosmopolitanism allows university administrators to trumpet their commitment
to racial justice without revolutionizing their educational policies to truly
reflect it. Against this background, the law school's self-portrayal as an
institution committed to racial justice amounts to little more than "'an
outpouring of self-important
romance' reminiscent of a 'late-night fit of
228
drunken sentimentality.
Critical Race scholarship indicates that the Court's liberals are willing to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment 229
generously to reify race-conscious

affirmative-action programs and policies that "confer a benefit on white elite
groups, ,230 while "perpetuat[ing] the existing racial hierarchy. ' 231 At the same
time, those same liberals have proved unwilling to interpret the Constitution
with the same generosity in order to provide outsiders with expanded
opportunities to engage in educational experimentation, such as school

vouchers, which may advance their educational and economic
circumstances. 232 Although some members of the liberal wing of the Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris Court may have preferred to remain oblivious to the

ambition of black students to escape failing schools and insisted that their
future be conscripted to serve the interests of educational bureaucrats,233
Justice O'Connor, by contrast, was rightly concerned about the fate of
outsiders. 234 Coherent with James Forman's research confirming that school
235
choice has strong ties to the civil rights movement and black nationalism,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Zelman commendably allowed outsiders to

228. See Steven D. Smith, ConciliatingHatred, 144 FIRST THINGS 17, 18 (2004) (quoting
ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES IN
AN ANXIOUS AGE 61-62 (1994)).
229. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
230. Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About
Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1559 (1991) (book review).
231. Id; see also Hutchison, LiberalHegemony?, supra note 67, at 611-12 (giving additional
context to Justice Stevens' Adaranddissent).
232. Delgado, supra note 230, at 1559.
233. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 684-85 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (dismissing as irrelevant the educational crisis confronting African Americans in the
Cleveland School District).
234. See id at 663-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There
First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1288-89 (2005) ("[T]oo often missing from the historical account is the
left's substantial-indeed, I would say leading-contribution to the development of school
choice.... [T]hat choice has deep roots in liberal educational reform movements, the civil rights
movement, and black nationalism.").
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escape the racially discriminatory dropout factories furnished by the Cleveland
school board.236
In Grutter,however, Justice O'Connor returns to a familiar judicial pattern:
she defers to status, academic prestige, and Michigan's educational bureaucrats
Charles Lawrence "posits
premised on the law school's asserted good faith.
a connection between unconscious racism and the existence of cultural
symbols that have racial meaning., 238 He argues that:
The "cultural meaning" of an allegedly racially discriminatory act is
the best available analogue for, and evidence of, a collective
unconscious that we cannot observe directly. This test would thus
evaluate governmental conduct to determine whether it conveys a
symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance.
A finding that the culture thinks of an allegedly discriminatory
governmental action in racial terms would also constitute a finding
regarding the beliefs and motivations of the governmental
actors ....239
This approach uncovers the motivation and significance of governmental
action based on the implicit, racial message contained in the government's
240
conduct.
In keeping with Charles Lawrence, the cultural meaning of
diversity rhetoric symbolizes a constraint on minority participation while
providing a firewall to protect an institution's pursuit of status. Consistent
with that intuition, Richard Delgado shows that race-conscious remedies were
designed by members of dominant groups and produce scarce results. 24 1 These
remedies preserve elite ideals, including the exclusion of the masses, which
reinforce the continued economic and political dominance by elites.242 Hence,
it is doubtful that diversity rhetoric contributes to the eradication of the
vestiges of discrimination, which are all too evident in American society.
4. FindingParadox in Supreme Court Critics?
The fourth hypothesis suggests that the answer to Dworkin's critique of the
ParentsInvolved Court can be found in paradox. Finding no evidence that the
districts' plans were implemented to remedy the effects of past intentional

236. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I think it is worth elaborating
on the Court's conclusion that this inquiry should consider all reasonable educational alternatives
to religious schools that are available to parents. To do otherwise is to ignore how the
educational system in Cleveland actually functions.").
237. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 337-39 (2003).
238. Lawrence, supranote 135, at 324.
239. Id. (footnote omitted).
240. Id.
241. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Do You Really Want to
Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (1991).
242. Id. at 1224-25.
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discrimination, 243 the government's interest in diversity appeared to be the only
pathway to race-conscious student assignments. 244
Grutter's diversity
rationale proved unavailing to the school districts in ParentsInvolved for two
reasons. First, "Grutter 'relied upon considerations unique to institutions of
higher education,"' and race, "standing alone," determined the school
assignments of some students in the Seattle and Louisville districts. 245
Contrary to Justice O'Connor's insistence on the subtleties of individualized
treatment, the school districts used "racial classifications in a
'nonindividualized, mechanical' way, ' 246 as opposed to utilizing race as a plus
247
factor.
Second, the school districts flubbed the "'narrow tailoring' prong of
strict-scrutiny analysis because they had not seriously considered race-neutral
alternatives. 24 8
Nonetheless, Dworkin, in an obvious concession to paradox, praises
O'Connor's Grutter decision 249 despite the fact that the decision, affirmed by
her concurrence in Gratz, furnished the groundwork for the Parents Involved
holding, which he detests. 2 5° Dworkin argues that O'Connor "upheld the
University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admission plan because
the point and structure of
,,251that plan demonstrated beyond question that its
purposes252were legitimate.
Critical Race scholarship suggests this claim is
dubious.
Dworkin rebukes Justice Roberts' assertion that the Court need not
take a view on "whether 'racially concentrated' schools are educationally
disadvantageous ... because it would make no difference to its decision even
if [those who thought] such schools seriously harmed students.",253 Here,
Dworkin rightfully scolds the Court-if racially concentrated schools are
necessarily harmful to outsiders. 254 At the same time, Dworkin overlooks the
liberal wing of the Court's recent enthusiasm for dismissing the depth of the
255
educational crisis that confronts minority parents in Cleveland, Ohio.
There
is a cruel irony in the liberal wing's reliance on the First Amendment to deny
black students the opportunity to attend better-performing and more highly
243.
244.
245.
246.

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752 (2007).
Id. at 2753.
Estreicher, supra note 14, at 240 (quoting Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753-54).
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 244, 276, 280

(2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
247. See id at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
248. Estreicher, supra note 14, at 241.
249. See Dworkin, supra note 9, at 95.
250. See id. at 92, 94-95.
251.

Id. at 95.

252.

See supraPart III.B. 1-3.
Dworkin, supra note 9, at 92.
254. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776-77
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the mixed evidence on this question); infra Part III.C.
255. See, e.g., Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony?, supra note 67, at 611 (discussing the views of
253.

dissenting Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer in Zelman).
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integrated schools. 2 56 But such is the "majestic equality of the law[]., 25 7 It

equips hierarchs (judicial or otherwise) with an acceptable vocabulary to cover
their blindness to the plight of disadvantaged Americans when it suits their
preferences. The jurisprudential effort to invalidate Ohio's school choice
program, premised largely "on implausible grounds[,] effectively constitutes a
decision to preserve
the racially stigmatizing effects of public schools for
258
future generations.,
Dworkin notes that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in ParentsInvolved was
more sanguine about the legitimacy of race-conscious programs in public
schools 259 than was Chief Justice Roberts' opinion,26 but it is worth
documenting that Kennedy's equanimity is tempered by his dissent in
Grutter.261 Kennedy, perhaps O'Connor's most faithful disciple, held that the
school districts could legitimately concern themselves with preventing "de
,,262
facto resegregation.
Equally clear, "he found a special infirmity in 2the
63
cities' plans": they made the use of race an obvious deciding factor.
Consistent with Justice Kennedy's intuition, the ParentsInvolved Court ruling
accepts that the Grutterdecision stands for the proposition that "the law school
did not count back from its applicant pool to arrive at the 'meaningful
number' of minority students who were "necessary to achieve a genuinely
diverse student body." 264 On the other hand, one might argue that in Parents
Involved the school districts only engaged in slightly different, yet
impermissible, behavior when they endeavored to reach approximately the
same result permitted in Grutter. If true, acceptable modes of race-conscious
behavior depend largely on form as opposed to substance.
Grutter, Gratz, and Parents Involved concentrated on "whether affirmative

action is permissible, not whether it is required., 265 While Dworkin contends
that the latter case is the opening salvo in a remarkable judicial insurrection, it
is worth remembering that the primary question before the Supreme Court in
both Grutter and Gratz was whether the admissions programs fixed the share
of benefits so as to limit the participation of underrepresented minorities or
256. See id at 612, 613-14, 617, 618-19 (specifically noting the Zelman dissenters'
deployment of an "inflexible interpretation of the Establishment Clause").
257.

ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY, in THE Six GREATEST NOVELS OF ANATOLE

FRANCE 837 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1918).
258. Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony?, supra note 67, at 629.
259. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 95.
260. Id. at 94.
261. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-88 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,127 S.Ct. 2738, 2791 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (cited in Estriecher, supra note
14, at 242).
263. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 95-96.
264. Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2757.
265. See Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Grutter or Otherwise: Racial
Preferences and HigherEducation,21 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 3 (2004).
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others, or whether the programs were sufficiently flexible to elude judicial
preclusion. Answering in the affirmative in Grutter, O'Connor demurs 267
in
Gratz.266 Race-conscious programs, characterized by an obvious use of race
without meaningful individualized review, and which are not narrowly tailored
to the state's interest, thus cannot withstand Grutter's deferential review.
Consistent with this logic, the Parents Involved Court invalidated the school
districts' obvious race-conscious policies, which were aimed at reducing racial

homogeneity. 268 To be sure, both prongs of strict scrutiny-the compelling
interest test and narrow tailoring-"have an 'in-the-eye-of-the-beholder'
quality. '269 According to Professor Estreicher, this is particularly true:
[A]fter the Grutter Court... accepted as a compelling interest racebased viewpoint diversity, and the [attendant] necessity of
maintaining a "critical mass" of the under-represented racial
viewpoint. Once that hurdle was cleared, insistence on narrow
tailoring seems almost churlish.... Indeed, narrow tailoring appears
paradoxical because if racial diversity is what the state is seeking
(and can lawfully seek), racial preferences may be the best way to
get there-hence, the lament . . ., highlighted in [Justice] Breyer['s
ParentsInvolved] dissent, that it is simply incoherent to require the

state to get to a valid goal by the most circuitous route possible.27 °
Nevertheless, "guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution does not
prevent individuals from choosing to live together, to work together, or to send
their children to school together, so long as the State does not interfere with
their choices on the basis of race,"'271 and animated by the non-preferment
272
standard,
the Court invalidated the challenged school assignment plans. 273
The non-preferment principle is violated when students "would be placed in
preferred schools or denied placement in preferred schools because of their

266. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276-77 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
267. The obviousness of the university's' undergraduate admissions policy is verifiable.
Beginning in 1998, the policy automatically distributed twenty points to every applicant who was
a member of historically underrepresented racial and ethnic groups including African Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254-56. Beginning in 1999, Michigan's
admissions policy added an additional layer of review for some applications, but it is clear that
the school admitted virtually every qualified applicant from underrepresented groups. See id. at
256-57.
268. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
269. Estreicher, supranote 14, at 243.
270. Id.
271. Nelson, supra note 136, at 325-26 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
272. Estreicher, supranote 14, at 249.
273. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
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race." 274 Dworkin disagrees. Citing Chief Justice Roberts, Dworkin observes
that:
Seattle measured diversity only by the balance between white and
nonwhite students, and Louisville only by the proportion of AfricanAmerican students, in both cases neglecting the distinct diversity
contributed by Asian-American, Latino, and other racial and ethnic
groups. In fact, he said, these plans aimed not at diversity but at a
particular racial
balance, [which] was not, on its own, a compelling
275
state interest.
Conversely, Dworkin accepts that a court overly concerned with the pernicious
effects of racial balancing cannot ignore Justice Breyer's "unanswerable"
dissent which determined that racial isolation has very serious educational
disadvantages. 276
Although Dworkin admits that contrary evidence exists, he claims the Court
is entitled to defer to the educational judgment of school districts when they
accept that "black students do significantly better when they are not in either
almost all-black schools or schools with very few blacks. 277 Dworkin's
readiness to defer to the judgment of educational bureaucrats must be
bracketed. He condemns the eagerness of conservative Justices to defer to
legislatures when they pass measures that political conservatives favor, 278 but
in a stunning capitulation to irony, Dworkin urges deference to educational
entities when they implement his preferences
despite their unanswerable
complicity in the nation's educational crisis.28 Although it is possible that he
has thought longer and harder about the effects of racial isolation than I have, I
contend that instead of deferring to the educational judgment of school boards
that have contributed to America's ongoing educational malpractice, we should
seriously consider the social science evidence that Dworkin is unprepared to
accept. We should defer to the educational judgment of African American
parents who prefer a well-educated child prepared to triumph over the vestiges
of discrimination over a child whose proximity to white students vindicates the
preferences of others. Accordingly, grounds for suspicion regarding the
challenged school districts' admissions plans persist. Such suspicion is
incompatible with the deferential review that Dworkin and Justice Breyer
favor.

274. Estreicher, supra note 14, at 249
275. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 94.
276. Id. at 92.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See generally THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 12-13 (showing that by
the twelfth grade, both black and Hispanic students are almost four years behind their white and
Asian counterparts).
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C. Groundsfor Suspicion
Critical Race scholars should be just as distrustful of race-conscious public
school plans as they are of similar university plans unless such plans serve to
tangibly benefit the interest of marginalized students. The goal of the
contested plans in Seattle and Louisville was the same: to reduce racial
homogeneity in individual schools. 28 For current purposes, I concentrate on
the Seattle district, wherein decreasing the level of racial homogeneity was
achieved through racial tiebreakers. 28 Homogeneity was determined by a
baseline established by the district's racial composition: "In the district's
public schools approximately 41 percent of enrolled students are white; the
remaining 59 percent, comprising all other racial groups, are classified by
Seattle for assignment purposes as nonwhite." 283 The base-line was designed
to impede the ability of certain students to select entrance in the more popular
schools. 284 If a given public high school was oversubscribed (selected by too
many students), and if the "school [was] not within 10 percentage points of the
district's overall white/nonwhite racial balance, it is what the district calls
'integration positive,' and the district employs a tiebreaker that selects for
assignment285 students whose race 'will serve to bring the school into
balance.'
Analyzed from a Critical Race perspective, the Seattle admissions plan
arouses mistrust for a number of reasons. First, the district offered the
customary rhetoric about the inherent educational value of diversity. 286 This
vocabulary conceals the possibility that diversity denotes a limitation on the
participation of members of particular disadvantaged groups and constitutes a
distraction from educational reform that places the interest of outsiders at the
center of the educational debate.
[U]nder the Seattle plan, a school with 50 percent Asian-American
students and 50 percent white students but no African-American,
Native-American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced,
while a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent AfricanAmerican,
25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white students would
87
not.

2

281. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746
(2007).
282. Id.at 2747 (describing the Seattle Public school plan).
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. Id. If racial tiebreakers were insufficient for selection purposes, non-racial tiebreakers
were used during the next step in the selection process. Id.
286. Id. at 2754 ("The Seattle 'Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale' speaks of
the 'inherent educational value' in '[p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with
diverse student enrollment."').
287. Id.
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In the latter case, African Americans would be prevented from attending their
preferred schools, while a white student would be welcomed. As the Court
noted, "[i]t is hard to understand how a plan that could allow these results can
be viewed as being concerned with achieving enrollment that is 'broadly
diverse."' 288 That is, unless diversity rhetoric can be understood as a vehicle
for limiting the participation of black students and members of other
disfavored groups.
To be sure, one might endeavor to justify race-conscious decision-making in
Seattle in a more straightforward way: the purported necessity of creating
racially integrated schools as a device to overcome racially segregated housing
patterns. 289 If evidence sufficient to meet a high burden of proof can be
adduced that shows the creation of racially integrated schools leads to
improved cognitive achievement-including higher test scores29 ° and lower
drop-out rates-and otherwise operates as an efficacious remedy for past
discrimination (intentional or otherwise), black students and their parents
might have reason to celebrate the school districts' heroic efforts.29' However,
the school districts themselves declined to either embrace the conclusion that
they were guilty of intentional discrimination or to present evidence
(persuasive or otherwise) that their current race-conscious policy constituted a
remedy for past intentional discrimination. 292 Equally clear, the district failed
to show that it had engaged in unconscious racism, declined to provide
convincing evidence that African Americans and other outsiders received
cognitive benefits from the district's race-conscious approach, and refused to
explain why a district committed to diversity nevertheless intentionally
operated a single-race academy. 293 Taken together, these failures signal that
the school system has a credibility problem when it comes to race.
Second, grounds for suspicion surface over the issue of deference to local
school boards. Whether Parents Involved was correctly decided, or whether
Justice Breyer's well-argued dissent is correct, it is difficult to accept his
proposal that the Court should, in deference to the school board's judgment,

288. Id
289. Id.at 2755.
290. See, e.g., THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 4 ("Test scores matter....
They tell us precisely what we need to know if we have any hope of reforming education and
closing the racial gap in academic achievement. Good tests measure the knowledge and skills
that demanding jobs and college courses require.").
291. Cf ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (declining to resolve the dispute on test scores).
292. Id.at 2761 ("Not even the school districts go this far, and for good reason.").
293. See id.at 2777 n.12 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Of course, if the Seattle school board
were truly committed to the notion that diversity leads directly to educational benefits, operations
[of an 'African American Academy'] with such a high 'nonwhite' enrollment would be a
shocking dereliction of its duty to educate the students enrolled in that school.").
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decline to invoke strict scrutiny.294 The reason for this difficulty is clear:
Substantial evidence shows that America's school boards have contributed to
the nation's educational malpractice. Malpractice disproportionately disfavors
African American students and other underrepresented minorities. 295 For
example, a recent study conducted by Johns Hopkins University reveals that
seventy-eight high schools in the State of Michigan with high concentrations of
minority students have been labeled "dropout factories."96 Twenty-one of
Detroit's thirty-seven high schools made the list. 297 It makes little sense to
respect the judgment of entities that have so far failed to educate black
students, let alone eradicate the vestiges of discrimination in America. Rather
than deference, as classical-liberal reformists caution, policy-makers who
operate such deficient programs should be held responsible for the
discriminatory effects of their programs, even if a lack of evidence of
purposeful discriminatory intent can be found. A positive step in the right
direction would arm parents with the presumptive legal right to pursue
economic damages from incompetent and discriminatory school systems as a
form of reparation.
Finally, the viability of diversity and integration to solve problems should
give rise to escalating incredulity. Although Justice Ginsburg rightly argues
that "we are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects
of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our
communities and schools, '298 suspicion arises over the possibility that diversity
is being offered as a convenient panacea. At best, the evidence is mixed
because "[p]erhaps desegregation does not have a single effect, positive 299
or
negative, on the academic achievement of African American students."
When and if white and minority students perform better academically in
majority white schools, it is "likely that these schools provide greater
opportunities to learn," but desegregation standing alone is not sufficient to

294. See id. at 2766 (majority opinion) (discussing Justice Breyer's proposed deference and
describing it as "fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
295. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
296. Michigan Stung by Study's Dropout List, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, at B 1. The
Associated Press commissioned this analysis of Education Department data and its online
presentation shows each state's high school statistics. ASSOCIATED PRESS, DROPOUT FACTORIES
(2007), http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/dropout/index.html.
297. Michigan Stung by Study's DropoutList, supra note 296. For a list of Detroit's thirtyseven high schools see greatschools: The Parent's Guide to K-12 Success, Detroit Public High
Schools,
http://www.greatschools.net/schools.page?city=Detroit&lc=h&state=MI&stpublic&
showall--true.
298. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
299. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Ronald D.
Henderson et al., High-Quality Schooling for African American Students, in BEYOND
DESEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF QUALITY IN AFRICAN AMERICAN SCHOOLING 162,

(Mwalimu J. Shujaa ed., 1996)).
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produce these desired results. 300 Belying its commitment to diversity, the
Seattle school board "operates a K-8 'African-American Academy,' which has
a 'nonwhite' enrollment of 99%.,301 Such incoherent behavior correlates with
mounting incredulity regarding the legitimacy of government efforts that are
premised on diversity rhetoric. Indeed, from a Critical Race perspective,
mistrust of educational hierarchs ought to be the null hypothesis.
Moreover, attempts to exchange diversity, cosmopolitanism, or integration
for an adequate education are likely to eviscerate the economic aspirations of
outsiders, because a concentration "on demographic issues detracts from
focusing on improving schools." 30 2 Consistent with that claim, "Professor Bell
has noted that the economic and political realities of urban America may mean
that earnest implementation of the desegregation principle can actually hurt the
educational opportunities afforded black children" in some cases. 3 03 The
simple-minded pursuit of racial proximity or racial diversity as a classroom
goal is not an adequate substitute for a serious commitment to improving the
educational circumstances of African American students and other outsiders.
Derrick Bell's assertion is supported by the fact that "in 1899, there were
four academic public high schools in Washington D.C., 3 04 Of the four, one
was black and the other three were white. 30 5 Yet, on standardized tests given
in 1899, "students in the black high school averaged higher test scores than
students in two of the three white high schools. ' 30 6 That same school
"repeatedly equaled or exceeded national educational norms on standardized
tests in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s.''307 From this evidence, it could be
determined that racial proximity and racial diversity standing alone are not
adequate substitutes for educational performance that transcends difficult
circumstances and would enable
black students to overcome the vestiges of
3 8
slavery and discrimination. 0

300. Id. at 2776-77 n.11 (quoting Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student
Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 744 (1998)).
301. Id.at 2777.
302. Id.at 2776 (quoting Henderson et al., supra note 299, at 166).
303. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 764 (citing Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470

(1976)).
304. THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS AND WHITE LIBERALS 204 (2005) [hereinafter
SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS].

305. Id
306. Id.
307. Id; Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence-The Case of DunbarHigh School, 35 PUB. INT.
3, 8 (1974).
308. See SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS, supra note 304, at 204. Difficult circumstances can be
shown by examining the occupations of the parents of the children at this school: "As of
academic year 1892-93, of the known occupations of these parents, there were 51 laborers, 25
messengers, 12 janitors, and one doctor." Id.
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Consistent with this intuition, in November 2007, Dr. Serge Herzog
published the first study that objectively measured the "[e]ffects of ethnic [and]
racial diversity among students and faculty on [the] cognitive growth of
undergraduate students. 3 °9 "Using objective measures of compositional,
curricular, and interactional diversity based on... enrollment records of [more
than] 6,000 students at a public research university," the study found that
diversity failed to yield patterns that show a "positive correlation with
objective measures of cumulative academic achievement., 310 While additional
research is needed, diversity if it promises anything at all, delivers substantially
less than it promises. Individuals and groups animated by a serious interest in
the educational progress of outsiders should be wary of diversity rhetoric
whether it comes from the Supreme Court or other elites. Although such
rhetoric may be in the interest of elites, it is unlikely that diversity, duly
transmuted into cosmopolitanism, serves the interest of African Americans and
other outsiders in obtaining an adequate education.
IV. CONCLUSION
From a Critical Race perspective, "[a] comprehensive and culturally
informed inspection of the historical and sociological evidence demonstrates
that ... the purported contribution of public schools [and public universities]
to [our] democracy [has] inescapably been fused... with racist oppression and
'
This
apartheid-like exclusion, and thus contribute to social stratification."311
grim history cannot be rescued by diversity rhetoric. Given this history, it is
possible to understand that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Zelman
constitutes her most promising decision, because she placed the interest of
outsiders ahead of elites. She emphasized the parents' right to exercise true
private choice, because "[t]o do otherwise is to ignore how the educational
system in Cleveland [and America] actually functions., 312 She deserves our
of outsiders in
admiration because she was unwilling to conscript the interest
3 13
order to reify liberal perspectives on the First Amendment.
While diversity as a prolepsis-the present anticipation-of the
cosmopolitan era fails to capture everyone, it now seems clear that Justice
O'Connor's recent explication of race and education favors the magisterium of
diversity rhetoric combined with deference to the educational judgment of
administrators who have contributed directly or inadvertently to America's
public education crisis. But of course, she is not alone. Whatever side one
309. Serge Herzog, Diversity and Educational Benefits: Moving Beyond Self-Reported
QuestionnaireData, EDUC. WORKING PAPER ARCHIVE, Nov. 19, 2007, at 1, http://www.uark.
edu/ua/der/EWPA/Research/Achievement/1 799.pdf.
310. Id. at 1, 38-40 ("[T]he statistical evidence scarcely permits a ringing endorsement of the
view that racially diverse classrooms produce distinctively greater educational gains.").
311. Hutchison, LiberalHegemony?, supra note 67, at 629.
312. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
313. See, e.g., Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony?, supra note 67, at 629-30.
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takes in the various disputes that lie at the heart of the intersection of race and
education, a distinct possibility surfaces: there is an ossifying contradiction
between the interest of members of disadvantaged groups and what
commentators claim on their behalf. Given the current state of play within the
joints, race-conscious decision-making may produce ironic results that
"justifty] John Stuart Mill's conclusion that 'the benefits of constitutional
democracy in government are not adequate to protect [disfavored groups and]
individuals from the coercive power that can be exercised [or authorized] by a
majority. ' '3 14 It is likely that elite decision-making everywhere, purportedly
animated to solve the problem of racial isolation, can better be understood as
serving the often concealed "majoritarian function of promoting popular
preferences" and empowering bureaucrats "at the expense of minority
interests. '' 3 15 While scorning outsiders' interest in an education that improves
the cognitive achievement and economic prospects of their children, such
decision-making denotes an abuse of power that often assumes a sense of
tragic inevitability. A state that freezes out the interests of African Americans,
Hispanics, and others has no serious claim on our allegiance.

314.

Id. at 640 (quoting PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: TRUTH, MEANING &

PUBLIC DEBATE 149 (2002)) (first alteration added).
315. Girardeau A. Spann, PurePolitics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1974 (1990).

